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The empirical evidence presented in this paper casts serious doubts on the by now widely accepted "stylized 
facts" of the exchange rate based stabilization programs (ERBS) as they are stated in Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) 
and in Végh (1992). Even though the ERBS programs were associated with output booms, no evidence of booms 
provoked by the stabilization programs is found. Rather, exogenous capital inflows to Latin America seem to have 
caused both the output booms and the stabilization programs. Other stylized facts, namely that the ERBS 
programs cause real exchange rate appreciations and trade account deficits are not rejected by the analysis 




La evidencia empírica presentada en  el trabajo cuestiona los hechos estilizados asociados a los planes de 
estabilización basados en el tipo de cambio (ERBS) establecidos por Kiguel y Liviatan (1992) y Végh(1992).  
Existe una asociación entre ERBS y booms de nivel de actividad pero no se encuentra evidencia de booms 
provocados por la implementación de planes de estabilización. Entradas exógenas de capital parecen haber 
causado tanto los booms de nivel de actividad como los planes de estabilización. Hechos estilizados como la 
apreciación del tipo de cambio real y los déficits de cuenta corriente provocados por ERBS no son rechazados 






Latin America has by now a long experience with high inflation. Not surprisingly, many attempts have been made 
to reduce the rate of growth of prices in the region. Unfortunately, most of the disinflation programs have failed: 
inflation reduced just temporarily, while large distortions in relative prices, in absorption and in the external 
accounts have been associated with these programs. 
 
Even though there is a broad consensus on the existence of distortions associated with price stabilization 
programs in high inflation countries, there is a fundamental disagreement on the nature of these distortions. 
According to the "traditional" view, stabilization programs provoke an initial recession, an exchange rate 
appreciation, and a deficit in the current account of the balance of payments, because of the rigidities in nominal 
contracts (Fischer, 1988; Taylor 1980, among others). The first of these "stylized facts" has been recently 
challenged in relation with the stabilization programs that use the exchange rate as the nominal anchor. Indeed, 
several recent empirical studies conclude that the exchange rate based stabilization programs (ERBS) are actually 
associated with an initial upsurge of economic activity rather than with an initial recession (Kiguel and Liviatan, 
1992; Végh, 1992; Végh and Reinhart, 1994; and Végh and Reinhart, 1995). There is a growing related 
theoretical literature aimed at explaining these "booms" (Calvo, 1986; Calvo and Végh, 1993; Helpman and 
Razin, 1987; Roldós, 1995a and b; among others). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to revise the empirical evidence about the ERBS programs in Latin America. The 
conflicting "stylized fact", namely whether the ERBS programs caused recessions or booms, is analyzed in 
section 2. No evidence of booms provoked by the ERBS is found.  In section 3, the evidence for the existence of 
real exchange rate appreciation and trade account deterioration imputable to the ERBS programs is analyzed. The 
possibility that exogenous capital inflows to Latin America have conditioned the launching of the stabilization 
programs is explored in section 4. The main empirical findings are summarized in section 5. Section 6 ends the 
paper with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The empirical evidence on the booms 
 
It has been shown that countries that launched ERBS programs experienced high rates of growth of output 
(Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992; Végh, 1992). There is however an important missing point in this analysis: basically 
the same high rates of growth of output took place at the same time in other countries that had not launched ERBS 
programs (table 1). This coincidence strongly suggests that the booms could have been caused by something else 





Countries with ERBS in 1967-1970
a    4.0% 
Other Latin American Countries 1967-1970
b    4.9% 
Countries with ERBS in 1978-1981
c    4.0% 
Other Latin American Countries 1978-1981
d    4.7% 
Countries with ERBS in 1991-1993
e    6.2% 
Other Latin American Countries 1991-1993
f    4.9% 
 
Notes. Average GDP Growth. Source: IFS, IMF. a) Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. b) 18 countries, see the Appendix for a list. c) 





Another piece of evidence in favor of the boom hypothesis is provided by Reinhart and Végh (1994) by means of 
regression analysis on panel data for the seven Latin American countries that applied stabilization plans. The dependent 
variable is the rate of growth of output, and the explanatory variables are dummies that represent the stabilization 
programs. The idea is to show that there is a business cycle associated with these programs. To this end, Reinhart and 
Végh build four dummies. 'EE' stands for "exchange early" and takes value 1 in the first year of an ERBS program and 0 
otherwise. 'EL' stands for "exchange late" and takes value 1 in the last year of an ERBS program and 0 in other years. 
'ME' (money early) takes value 1 in the first year of a money based stabilization program, while 'ML' (money late) takes 
value 1 in the last year of a money program. Their results are reproduced as table 2. 
 
Table 2  

























Notes. Source: Reinhart and Végh (1994). Period: 1964-1993. Countries included are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican 
Republic, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Random effects estimates reported. Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
Interestingly enough, the Reinhart-Végh regression reproduces very well the stylized business cycle associated with the 
stabilization programs. In particular, it is found an early boom and a recession later in the ERBS, while money based 
stabilization programs are associated with recessions from the very beginning. 
 
These results, however, do not seem robust. The main problem of the regression in table 2 is that there seems to be some 
important missing variables. With the specification adopted, the business cycle can only be captured by the stabilization 
programs. In so far as a business cycle exists, this specification biases the results in favor of the stabilization-program-
business-cycle hypothesis. If this equation were correct, the rate of growth of GDP in Latin American countries should 
be white noise when stabilization programs are not in place. Of course, this is not a very convincing description of the 
business cycle, and indeed Reinhart and Végh do not claim it is. However, such description is implied by their analysis. 
Otherwise, the residuals in Reinhart-Végh regression would exhibit a systematic behavior.  
 
The Reinhart-Végh regression is not robust with respect to small changes in the dummies or the period of estimation. 




be considered the first year of a stabilization program or the last year of the prestabilization period. These weaknesses of 
the estimation could be a consequence of the existence of some important missing variables.   
 
Which are the missing variables? The list could be long, but the fact that Latin American countries are small open 
economies suggests that international transmission mechanisms should be important.  
 
Some evidence in favor of this hypothesis is provided by the principal components analysis for deviations from trend 
GDP in 18 Latin American countries presented in table 3. The striking fact is that the first two principal components 
explain more than seventy per cent of the whole variance. Table 3 reports similar results for private sector credit and 
fixed investment.  
 
Table 3 
Principal components, 18 Latin American Countries 
Cumulative R squared 
 
 




Deviations from trend GDP
a  0.429 0.706 0.798 
Credit/GDP
b  0.456 0.707 0.815 
Fixed Gross Investment
c  0.532 0.733 0.806 
 
Notes. a) Residuals from a regression of GDP against a trend and a constant. 18 latinamerican countries, 1970-1993. Source: IFS, 
IMF b) Commercial bank loans to the private sector (line 22d in the IMF's IFS)as a percentage of nominal GDP. 12 latin american 







These figures suggest, not surprisingly, that international transmission mechanisms or common external-to-the-region 
determinants are very important in Latin American business cycle. Thus, explanatory variables to capture these 
mechanisms or the external determinants should be included in the regression. Two such variables are the rate of growth 
of industrialized countries and the capital flows between Latin America and the rest of the world. 
1 It is interesting to 
notice that the comovement of Latin American countries GDP seems to be associated with capital inflows to the region 
(see figure 1). 
 
 Figure  1 
 
 
                                                            
     
1  The rate of growth of industrialized countries is indeed exogenous in this regression, but there might be doubts with 
respect to capital flows. Capital inflows might be induced by the stabilization policy in those countries that launched an 
ERBS program (Calvo and Végh, 1993; among others). However, this qualification could only apply for the programs 
implemented in the largest countries in the region, which are the only ones that can significantly alter capital inflows to 
Latin America as a whole. Besides, the analysis in the next section suggests that capital flows in Latin America have 






The estimation of the regression that includes the growth of OECD countries and capital inflows to Latin America is 
presented in table 4 along with a reproduction of Reinhart and Végh's regression for this sample. 
 
Table 4 
Real GDP Growth 
18 Latin American Countries 1971 - 1993 
 
Regression     1     2 
















Industrial Countries' GDP Growth     0.616 
(0.124) 
Capital Inflows to Latin America     0.017 
(0.003) 
R Squared   0.07   0.21 
Method   OLS    FE 
 
Notes. Dependent variable is standardized (country by country) real GDP growth (source: World Bank). For regression 2 the 
sample period is 1971-1992. a) Source IFS, IMF. b) First difference of the log of total capital inflows to Latin American countries 
(Source:  ECLAC Yearbook) Standard deviations in parenthesis 
 
The results are now more robust. The R-squared is acceptable for panel data, while the estimation is quite robust against 
small changes in the variables and in the period of estimation. 
2 The rate of growth of GDP of industrial countries
3 and 
the capital inflows to Latin America are highly significant variables in explaining the business cycle in the region. They 
also exhibit the expected sign. Therefore, these seem to be appropriate variables to control for determinants of the 
business cycle other than the stabilization programs. This control is crucial in order to single out the specific effects of 
these programs on the business cycle. 
                                                            
     
2  Other estimations are available upon request. 
     





Having made the controls, which are the systematic fluctuations in the rate of growth of GDP that can be attached to the 
stabilization programs? Only recessions! The dummies for "exchange late" (EL) and "money early" (ME) continue 
exhibiting negative and highly significative coefficients, but the coefficient of the dummy for "exchange early" (EE), that 
in Reinhart-Végh regression captured the boom, becomes now not significantly different from zero. The growth of the 
OECD countries and the capital inflows to the region seem to account now for the booms in output, leaving no 
explanatory power to the ERBS programs.    
 
There is a common methodological point behind the empirical analysis in this section (both in tables 1 and 4): in order to 
test for the existence of a business cycle associated with the stabilization programs, systematic deviations with respect to 
the "ordinary" business cycle should be identified in connection with these programs. In the regression analysis 
presented in table 4, the "ordinary" business cycle is captured by the rate of growth of GDP in OECD countries and by 
capital inflows to Latin America. Further research will likely show that other variables are also important in explaining 
Latin American business cycle. Besides, techniques that allow for a more flexible and richer time structure are desirable 
for the analysis of an intrinsically dynamic topic like the business cycle. A better understanding of these issues will 
indeed help in testing for the consequences of the stabilization programs.  
 
Easterly (1996) provides yet another piece of evidence connecting the ERBS programs with output booms, but without 
concluding that the former caused the latter. Like in the other papers discussed above, there is no attempt to control for 
other possible determinants of the business cycle. But unlike in previous literature, Easterly does not establish a causal 
direction between booms and plans, leaving open the possibility that the launching of the stabilization programs can be 
explained by the output expansion in the fashion of the new political economy. A related idea is explored in section 4 
below. 
 
3. Real exchange rate appreciation and trade account deficits 
 
There is a general consensus on the existence of other two "stylized facts" associated with the ERBS programs, namely 
the real exchange rate appreciation and the trade account deficits. Still, it seems convenient to revise the empirical 
evidence in the light of the methodological point raised in the previous section. The real exchange rate appreciation, for 
instance, could be provoked by exogenous capital inflows, instead of being a consequence of the stabilization programs. 
However, the analysis in this section supports the commonly held view that the ERBS programs were associated with 





 Table  5 
 
  Panel Data estimates for Real Exchange Rate and Trade Balance in 13 Latin American Countries, 1970 - 1991 
 




























Lagged Real Exchange Rate   0.739 
(0.04) 
 
Pre 79   0.253 
(0.146) 
 
Post 79   0.311 
(0.135) 
 
Capital Inflows/Nominal GDP    -0.877 
(0.145) 
Percentage change in Terms of Trade     0.076 
(0.011) 
R Squared   0.70   0.27 
Method    FE    FE 
 
Notes. Fixed effects estimates are reported. A structural break was found in the real exchange rate regression, which motivates the 
dummy variables Pre79 and Post79. Pre79 equals one for the years before 1979 (inclusive) and Post79 equals one for the years 
after 1979. a) Log of the real exchange rate (vis a vis the U.S.A.) using consumer price indexes. Source: IFS, IMF. Since real 
exchange rate data for Venezuela were no available 12 countries are included in this regression b) Nominal Trade Balance (Source: 
IFS, IMF)/ Nominal GDP (Source: World Bank). c) Log of terms of trade (Source:  ECLAC Yearbook). d) Log of total capital 





Table 5 contains the results of regressions with panel data. The dependent variable in the first one is the real exchange 
rate (RER) of each Latin American country vis-a-vis the USA (see the appendix for the details). Four dummies are 
included for the ERBS programs. A1, A2 and A3 stand for the first to the third year of the program, and take value 1 in 
year i (i=1,2,3) and 0 in other years. A4 stands for the fourth and following years of the program. Two other explanatory 
variables were included to control for the terms of trade and capital inflows to the region. The autoregressive component 
in the RER was captured including the lagged variable in the right hand side of the equation.  
 
The results in table 5 show that the ERBS programs had an effect on the real exchange rate, independent of the effects of 
capital inflows. In other words, both capital inflows to Latin America and the ERBS programs tend to reduce the real 
exchange rate. The coefficient for the ERBS programs becomes significantly negative in the third year of the program.  
 
The second regression in table 5 has the Latin American countries trade accounts as the dependent variable. The same 
four dummies described above are used to capture the possible effects of the ERBS programs. Capital inflows and the 
terms of trade are also included between the explanatory variables.  
 
According to the regression analysis, both the capital inflows and the ERBS programs were associated with lower trade 
account surpluses. As in the real exchange rate equation the coefficient for the ERBS programs becomes significantly 





4. When do stabilization programs take place?  
 
Having experienced high inflation for more than three decades, it is hardly surprising that many stabilization programs 
have been implemented in Latin America in this period. But, what determines the opportunity in which policymakers 
decide to launch a new program? The answer, being important by itself, might also help to understand the existence of 
conflicting views about the nature of the business cycle associated with the ERBS programs. It is argued in this section 
that the launching of a new ERBS program in Latin America is more likely in periods of positive capital inflows to the 
region. The availability of foreign credit seems to raise the policymakers willingness to run the risk of implementing an 
ERBS program. Capital inflows also provoke consumption booms, and hence the coincidence of the booms and the 
stabilization programs. Besides, capital inflows are to a large extent determined by external factors, and take place 
simultaneously in most Latin American countries. Therefore, consumption booms are not limited to those countries that 
launched an ERBS program. 
 
There are three empirically testable hypotheses in the story of the previous paragraph: 
  1) capital inflows cause GDP growth; 
  2) capital inflows are positively associated with the number of countries that launch ERBS programs; and 
  3) capital inflows are exogenous with respect to the ERBS programs. 
The hypotheses (2) and (3) imply that capital inflows cause the ERBS programs (Engle, Hendry and Richard, 1983). 
The empirical evidence on these three hypotheses is presented below. 
 
Hypothesis 1: (capital inflows cause GDP growth) 
 
Table 6 contains the results of a causality test between capital inflows to Latin America and GDP. It is worth 
emphasizing that both variables are the aggregates of the whole region. According to this analysis, capital inflows 
Granger-cause GDP in Latin America, while the reverse is not true, i.e. there is one direction causality from capital 
inflows to GDP. 
4 
                                                            
     
4  Notice that the story of the first paragraph is compatible with both, two direction causality and one direction 





Table 6  
Granger Causality Tests 
 
  
Dependent Variable  L.A. GDP
a Capital  Inflows
b Capital  Inflows 
F statistic
c 3.3    0.8  1.5 
p-value
d 0.05    0.4  0.27 
Durbin's h  0.01  -0.2  0.25 
R-Squared 0.89    0.67  0.85 
Number of lags  2  1   6 
 
Notes. a) Latin American GDP (deviations from trend) Source: IFS b) Capital inflows at constant prices (Source: ECLAC 
Yearbook)c) F statistic for Granger non-causality d) Probability that a F-distributed (with the appropriate degrees of freedom) 
random variable should fall to the right of the value obtained for these regressions. The h and R squared statistics reported refer to 
the regression where lagged values of both variables are included. The sample period used is 1964-1991.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2: (capital inflows are associated with the ERBS programs) 
 
Qualitative response models seem to provide the adequate techniques to asses the association between ERBS programs 
and capital inflows to Latin America. Markov chain models were estimated for panel data and Poisson regressions were 
run for aggregate data. 
 
In order to estimate a Markov chain model, the observations (country-year) were classified in three states of nature: no 
ERBS program (state 0), first year of an ERBS program (state 1) and mature ERBS program (second year and later, 
state 2). It was assumed that the states follow a Markov process with transition probabilities Pij, where Pij is the 
probability that a country be in time t+1 in state j  given that it is in time t in state i. Some of these probabilities are 
obviously zero, e.g. it is not possible to find a mature program next year in a country that has no program this year. The 
process' stochastic matrix is: 
 
 
Install Equation Editor and double-





Here φ(.) is the normal cumulative distribution function, xt is the increase in capital inflows in year t with respect to the 
average of the previous three years and the greek letters are the parameters to be estimated. Assuming that the initial 
state is drawn from a degenerate distribution (assigning probability one to the state that actually occurred for each 
country) and that realizations across countries are independent, the parameters can be estimated for panel data through 
maximum likelihood (see Amemiya (1985)).The results are presented in table 7. 
 
Table 7  
Markov Chain Estimates 
 
 
Parameters Estimates  Standard  Errors 
     β0  -1.502      0.209 
     β1   0.004      0.002 
     α0   0.533      0.733 
     α1   0.003      0.014 
     δ0   0.673      0.342 
     δ1   0.005      0.004 
 
 
Notes. Since the method of estimation is maximum likelihood, estimators are asymptotically normally distributed and a t-style 
test is appropriate. The 5 latin american countries that applied ERBS plans are included. The sample is 1965-1992. 
 
According to this estimation, an increase in capital inflows significantly raises the probability that a country that was not 
stabilizing (with the exchange rate as the nominal anchor) initiates an ERBS program (β1 is significantly positive).  
 
If the number of ERBS programs per year is Poisson distributed and both non-autocorrelation and cross country 
independence are assumed, a Poisson regression can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques: 
 
Install Equation Editor and double-





where xt is, as before, a measure of the increase in capital inflows in t, yt is the number of ERBS programs in Latin 
America in t and the betas are the parameters to be estimated. A positive β1 would mean that the probabilities of 
observing one or more ERBS programs in Latin American countries rise together with the capital inflows to the region. 
Indeed, notice that: 
 
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation. 3 
and: 
 
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation. 4 
Two Poisson regressions are reported in table 8. The first one excludes the Argentinean 1985 Austral program and the 
Brazilian 1986 Cruzado program, while the second one includes the whole sample. In the first case, the coefficient β1 is 
significantly different from zero at 10%, while in the second it is so at 1%. This difference suggests that the model does 
not fit well these two programs.  
 




Parameters (1)  (2) 










Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. Regression 1 does not include the Austral and Cruzado plans while regression 2 includes all 





The lack of a variable for inflation acceleration in the Poisson regression might be one reason for its apparently bad 
performance in fitting the Austral and Cruzado programs. It has been argued that the Austral program was motivated by 
the authorities' concern about an inflation that was going out of control, even when they were aware that external 
conditions were not favorable (for an interpretation of this experience on these lines see Canavese and Di Tella, 1988; 
Machinea and Fanelli, 1988). Similarly, Simonsen (1988) has pointed out that the 1986 Brazilian Cruzado program was 
an attempt to stop inflation when it was growing. External conditions for Brazil were favorable, according to Simonsen 
(1988) and Ortiz (1988), but not precisely because of increased capital inflows. 
 
These results, being promising, are indeed preliminary. On the one hand, it seems remarkable that simple qualitative 
models including capital inflows as the only explanatory variable give an account of the opportunity of the ERBS 
programs in Latin America. But, on the other hand, there might be some missing explanatory variables, while the 
statistical models used so far might not be the most appropriate ones. 
 
Economic theory, observation of some cases and even common sense suggest that there must be other relevant variables 
in explaining the ERBS programs not included in the statistical analysis presented above. The discussion of the Austral 
and Cruzado experiences is illustrative in this respect. 
 
Also, as it is often the case, the statistical models used to test the association between capital inflows and the occurrence 
of ERBS programs require making some assumptions which might not be completely appropriate for the variables at 
handle. First, the Markov model is based on the assumption that cross-country observations of the ERBS programs are 
statistically independent. However, it cannot be ruled out that the implementation of a stabilization program in one 
country induce neighboring countries to follow. There might be a "demonstration effect". Also the exchange rate 
appreciation in the first country might create favorable conditions for launching an ERBS program in the following 
country. Second, Poisson regression estimation is based on the assumption that there is no autocorrelation. Yet, once an 
ERBS program has been initiated, it seems likely that the same program will continue at least for the second year. So, 
assuming non-autocorrelation in the number of stabilization programs in Latin America does not seem especially 
realistic. The estimation might still be consistent if λt above is correctly specified (see Winkelman and Zimmerman, 
1995). 
 
Hypothesis 3: (exogeneity of capital inflows) 
 
Latin America has experienced large cyclical fluctuations in capital movements, which seem to be driven to a large 




degree of comovement across countries in the behavior of capital inflows. They have interpreted this comovement as an 
evidence of the existence of common external shocks affecting Latin America. The important capital inflows to the 
region in the late seventies and in the early nineties can be associated, according to these authors, to reductions in the 
interest rates in the United States. In the seventies, the recycling of the petrodollars also played an important role in 
making funds available, while the recession that was taking place in the central economies reduced the opportunities for 
profitable investment in those countries. In the nineties, the reduction in interest rates was accompanied by weak 
performances in equity and real estate markets in the United States.  
 
A strong comovement of the commercial banks credit to the private sector is revealed by the principal components 
analysis reported in table 3. This analysis provides some additional - though indirect - evidence of the comovement of 
capital inflows, and highlights the importance of the banking system in channeling those capitals (an hypothesis already 
advanced by Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993). 
 
Morandé (1988) provides another piece of evidence supporting the hypothesis of exogeneity of capital inflows, for the 
case of Chile between 1977 and 1982. He performs causality tests between the real exchange rate and capital inflows, 
concluding that capital inflows tend to Granger-cause the real exchange rate, while capital inflows are close to being 
exogenous.  
 
Thus, if capital inflows have been mainly fostered by forces that are external to the region, they could not be just another 
consequence of the ERBS programs. They are mainly exogenous. Besides, the capital inflows considered in the Markov 
and Poisson models are the aggregate of the whole region, while countries implementing ERBS programs are never 
more than a few in each moment. Hence, it seems unlikely that the ERBS programs might cause significative capital 
inflows to the whole Latin America, save perhaps when the largest countries are stabilizing.  
 
5. The stylized facts revisited  
 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper could be summarized in the following set of "stylized facts" associated 
with the ERBS programs in Latin America during the last three decades: 
 
i) Most ERBS programs were launched when Latin American countries received increased flows of capitals from 
abroad. The cyclical pattern of the capital inflows to the region seems to have been basically determined by conditions 
out of Latin America. Apparently, policymakers have been more willing to initiate stabilization programs when capitals 





ii) The ERBS programs provoked recessions. No evidence of booms in output caused by the ERBS programs was 
found. Rather, capital inflows to Latin America provoked both output booms and the stabilization programs. Therefore, 
the output booms that are often ascribed to the ERBS programs actually took place simultaneously in most countries in 
the region, not only in those countries that were initiating stabilization programs. 
 
iii) Real exchange rate appreciations and increasing trade account deficits are imputable to the ERBS programs. Capital 
inflows also had these effects, but the analysis in this paper indicates that the stabilization programs had independent 
significant effects on these variables, though not during the first two years of the programs. 
 
This list of "facts" is not pretended to be complete, but just the set of regularities explored in this paper. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper casts serious doubts on the by now widely accepted "stylized facts" of the 
ERBS programs as they are stated in Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) and Végh (1992). It was shown that the empirical 
analysis in those papers lacked appropriate controls, and so overestimated the positive effects of the stabilization policies 
on output. In fact, no significant positive effects of the ERBS programs were found when variables that capture the 
"ordinary" business cycle were included, while the recessions remained. This result supports the "traditional" view that 
stabilization programs provoke just recessions, not booms (Fischer, 1988).  
 
At the very least, the analysis in this paper suggests that the evidence on the booms provoked by the stabilization 
programs should be carefully reassessed. Even if, after some more empirical research, it is found that the ERBS 
programs can have positive effects on output, the order of magnitude of those effects will likely be smaller than what it 
has been considered so far. It is interesting to notice, in this respect, that recent attempts to calibrate several models of 
the stabilization programs have basically failed to obtain output growth in the orders of magnitude that have been 
observed in actual experiences of ERBS programs (Reinhart and Végh, 1994; Rebelo and Végh, 1995). The results in 
the present paper might help to explain those failures in a simple way: the models cannot reproduce such booms simply 
because they were not provoked by the stabilization programs. Thus, maybe the models are basically correct when they 
predict at most modest production and consumption booms associated with the stabilization policies.  
 
A related "fact", that has been largely neglected in the literature, is that most ERBS programs were launched under 




stabilization programs in previous empirical studies. 
5 It is hypothesized in this paper that this was not a mere 
coincidence, but the result of the stabilization policies being endogenously determined by the external conditions. 
Capital inflows seem to have been key determinants of the opportunity of the ERBS programs in most experiences. In 
this respect, the evidence presented in this paper provides some empirical support for the theoretical analysis of Alesina 
and Drazen (1991), Casella and Eichengreen (1994) and Orphanides (1996). Therefore, both at the theoretical and the 
empirical level this line of research looks currently very promising. 
 
                                                            
     
5 It should be mentioned here that Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) have already noticed that most ERBS programs were 
initiated under favorable external conditions. Also Simonsen (1988) and Ortiz (1988) identified external conditions that 
were favorable to Brazil when the Cruzado program was launched. A similar point was made by Bruno and Piterman 
(1988) and by Cukierman (1988) for the 1985 Israeli stabilization program. However, somehow surprisingly, no further 
consequences for the analysis of the "stylized facts" associated with the ERBS programs seem to have been derived from 






IFS refers to the International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. ECLAC refers to the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
The differences between the data sets used are mainly due to data availability. Some countries were excluded from most 
estimations because of exceptional values in some variables (e.g. Nicaragua or El Salvador). 
 
The aggregate "industrial countries" is taken from the IFS and includes Austria, Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and U.S.A. 
 
Table 1.  
Countries with ERBS in 67-70 are: Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Other Latin American countries 67-70 are: Bolivia, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. 
Countries with ERBS in 78-81 are: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. Other Latin American countries 78-81 are: Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. 
Countries with ERBS in 91-93: Argentina and Uruguay. Other Latin American countries in 91-93: Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Suriname and Venezuela. 
 
Table 3 
GDP (18 countries): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Credit (12 countries): Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Fixed Gross Investment (18 countries): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 







18 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
 
Table 5 
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